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Defining "Otherwise Qualified Applicants":
Applying an Antitrust Relevant-Market Analysis
to Disparate Impact Cases
Scott Bakert
A plaintiff making a Title VII disparate impact claim must show
that an employer's hiring practice, test, or requirement tends to ex-
clude members of a protected class.' In other words, the plaintiff must
show that the practice in question causes the employer's workforce to
have a smaller percentage of minorities than the qualified applicant
pool.2 Because the result of this comparison rests on the question of
who is a qualified applicant, both plaintiffs and defendants seek to
shape the qualified applicant pool determination in their favor.
The disparate impact plaintiff would like to show that the quali-
fied applicant pool contains many persons in the protected class. As-
suming the employer's workforce does not contain many such persons,
such a showing allows the plaintiff to establish the prima facie case of
discrimination easily under a disparate impact theory. In contrast, the
defendant would like to show that the minority composition of the
qualified applicant pool perfectly mirrors the minority composition of
t B.A. Miami University 1994; J.D. Candidate 2000, The University of Chicago; Ph.D. Can-
didate (Economics) 2001, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.
I Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer to "fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any
individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin." Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub L No 88-352, 78 Stat 255, codified at 42
USC § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1994).
2 See Wards Cove Packing Co v Atonio, 490 US 642,650-51 (1989) (stating that a com-
parison "between the racial composition of the qualified persons in the labor market and the
persons holding at-issue jobs ... generally forms the proper basis for the initial inquiry in a dis-
parate-impact case").
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the employer's workforce. Thus, in disparate impact cases an impor-
tant threshold question exists:.who is a qualified applicant?
The Supreme Court has provided little guidance for lower courts
to use when deciding this issue. As a result, lower courts have resolved
the issue in inconsistent ways that often do not take into account the
basic economic theory of labor markets.
This Comment argues that the same economic and legal princi-
ples that courts use to define the relevant commodity market in mo-
nopolization cases3 should be used to define the relevant labor market
(i.e., the qualified applicant pool) in Title VII disparate impact cases.
Applying relevant-market principles from antitrust law in disparate
impact cases will achieve two goals: (1) it will increase the predictabil-
ity of applicant pool determinations, and (2) it will force litigants to
couch, and courts to decide, labor market issues within a coherent
economic and legal framework. Therefore courts should look to well
developed antitrust caselaw for guidance in determining the scope and
the shape of the qualified applicant pool.5
Part I of this Comment sets out the legal doctrine underlying the
disparate impact theory of discrimination. It outlines some of the
methods that courts currently use to determine the scope of the quali-
fied applicant pool and demonstrates that these methods often do not
reflect the basic economic principles that underlie labor market be-
havior. Part II illustrates that labor markets are no different than
commodity markets from an economic theory standpoint. Part III
outlines the legal tests used to define the relevant commodity market
in monopolization cases,6 and shows how antitrust law's relevant-
3 ' The Sherman Act makes monopolization unlawful. The Act states that "[e]very person
who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person
or persons, to monopolize any part of th6 trade or commerce among the several States ... shall
be deemed guilty of a felony." Sherman Act, 26 Stat 209 (1890), as amended by Pub L No 93-528,
88 Stat 1708 (1974), codified at 15 USC § 2 (1994).
4 Application of antitrust principles will also provide a response to the claim that the
qualified applicant pool determination is simply an ad hoc determination on the part of the dis-
trict court. See Marcel C. Garaud, Comment, Legal Standards and Statistical Proof in Title VII
Litigation: In Search of a Coherent Disparate Impact Model, 139 U Pa L Rev 455, 474 (1990)
(stating t at "[t]he process of determining the qualified applicant pool will result in a set of fig-
ures that is nothing more than a 'guesstimate' of the number of qualified applicants").
"5 This is not the first Comment to advocate applying antitrust principles to Title VII cases.
See Rachel L. Cantor, Comment, Consumer Preferences for Sex and Title VII Employing Market
Definition Analysis for Evaluating BFOQ Defenses, 1999 U Chi Legal F 493 (applying an anti-
trust analysis to determine when "sex" is a business product and therefore a legitimate defense
to a claim of sex discrimination).
6 Note that defining the relevant market is also important in evaluating mergers under
Section 7 of the Clayton Act. 38 Stat 731 (1914), codified at 15 USC § 18 (1994). The same legal
principles underscore the definition of the relevant market for monopolization purposes as for
merger evaluation purposes. See Julian 0. von Kalinowski, Peter Sullivan, and Maureen
McGuirl, Antitrust Laws and Trade Regulation § 24.01[4] (Matthew Bender 2d ed 1999) ("In de-
fining the market in a Section 7 case it is permissible to consult market definitions in Section 2
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market principles provide a sensible legal test for determining the
scope and shape of the relevant qualified applicant pool in Title VII
cases. Part IV offers an example of how district courts could easily ap-
ply the test proposed in Part III.
I. TITLE VII AND THE DISPARATE IMPACT THEORY
OF DISCRIMINATION
Disparate impact as a form of discrimination is based on the
premise that an employer's hiring requirements, though facially neu-
tral, can have discriminatory effects on a protected class. The Su-
preme Court recognized disparate impact as a viable discrimination
theory under Title VII soon after its passage,8 and has since issued a
number of decisions tangentially related to the determination of the
qualified applicant pool.9 None of these decisions provides an over-
arching principle for deciding the scope and shape of the qualified ap-
plicant pool. In fact, from a district court's perspective, the only thing
the Supreme Court has said in this regard is that labor market partici-
pants qualified for the job at issue (and only those participants)
should be included in the qualified applicant pool.'° Such a tautology
provides little practical assistance to lower court judges. As a result,
lower courts have applied an array of methods to determine what con-
stitutes the qualified applicant pool. Unfortunately, these methods are
often inconsistent with each other and with the basic economic theory
of labor markets.
cases and vice versa.").
7 See Griggs v Duke Power Co, 401 US 424,430 (1971) (stating that under Title VII "prac-
tices, procedures, or tests neutral on their face, and even neutral in terms of intent, cannot be
maintained" if discriminatory in operation).
8 Id.
9 See, for example, Wards Cove Packing Co v Atonio, 490 US 642 (1989) (holding that a
comparison between minority workers in cannery positions and minority workers in non-
cannery positions was not relevant in determining if a hiring practice had a disparate impact);
Hazelwood School District v United States, 433 US 299 (1977) (holding that a statistical compari-
son between the minority composition of the student body and the minority composition of the
teachers in a school was irrelevant to determining the existence of discrimination); International
Brotherhood of Teamsters v United States, 431 US 324 (1977) (finding that a statistical compari-
son between line truck drivers and the general population was relevant to determining the exis-
tence of discrimination).
10 See Hazelwood, 433 US at 308 (stating that the "proper comparison [is] between the ra-
cial composition of [the job at issue] and the racial composition of the qualified ... population in
the relevant labor market").
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A. From Griggs to Wards Cove:The Supreme Court Precedent
Governing Disparate Impact Cases
The Supreme Court first recognized disparate impact as a theory
of discrimination in Griggs v Duke Power Co." In Griggs, a group of
black plaintiffs challenged Duke Power's hiring requirements that
workers have a high school degree and pass two general intelligence
tests.'2 The plaintiffs claimed that the requirements were unrelated to
job performance and, because blacks were less likely to satisfy these
requirements, that Duke Power had effectively excluded blacks from
the workplace.1
3
The district court dismissed the plaintiffs' claim, finding that
Duke Power did not have any discriminatory intent when it adopted
its hiring requirements." The appellate court affirmed, holding that
discriminatory intent was an essential element of a Title VII claim.'-
The Supreme Court then reversed, concluding that "[Title VII] pro-
scribes not only overt discrimination but also practices [or hiring re-
quirements] that are fair in form, but discriminatory in operation.""
The Court ruled that Title VII prohibits employment practices that
have a disparate impact on a protected class."
The Griggs Court also created an exception to this general rule. If
a hiring practice, test, or requirement-fair in form, but discriminatory
in operation-is related to job performance, then it is not prohibited
under Title VII.
The Court next visited the disparate impact cause of action in Al-
bemarle Paper Co v Moody." In Moody, the Court set forth a three-
part burden-shifting test for evaluating disparate impact claims. First,
the plaintiff must make out a prima facie case of disparate impact by
showing "that the tests in question select applicants for hire or promo-
tion in a racial pattern significantly different from that of the pool of
applicants."20 Next, if the plaintiff makes this showing, then the burden
11 401 US 424,431 (1971).
12 Id at 426.
13 Id.
14 Id at 428.
15 Id (describing the court of appeals holding that because "there was no showing of a dis-
criminatory purpose in the adoption of the diploma and test requirements" there was no Tfle
VII violation).
16 Id at 431 (holding that Title VII does not require discriminatory intent, only discrimina-
tory consequences and a lack of business necessity, to constitute a violation).
17 Id (making an analogy between a test with a disparate impact and the "fabled offer of
milk to the stork and the fox").
18 In particular, the Court noted: "The touchstone is business necessity. If an employment
practice which operates to exclude [protected classes] cannot be shown to be related to job per-
formance, the practice is prohibited." Id.
19 422 US 405 (1975).
20 Id at 425. The Court in Albemarle did not define what constituted the appropriate quaIli-
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shifts to the employer to show that the employment requirements are
job related. Finally, if the defendant meets this burden, then the bur-
den shifts back to the plaintiff to show that other tests-that would
not have a disparate impact-would also serve the employer's legiti-
mate interest in hiring efficient and trustworthy employees.2 Although
the plaintiff's and defendant's burden of proof requirements were
clear after Albemarle, what constituted the "pool of applicants" -the
qualified applicant pool-necessary for assessing a plaintiff's prima
facie case remained largely undefined.
International Brotherhood of Teamsters v United States,' the next
Supreme Court case involving a statistical disparity between the quali-
fied applicant pool and the employer's workforce, did little to clarify
the definition of qualified applicant pool. In Teamsters, the govern-
ment alleged that an employer had engaged in a pattern and practice
of employment discrimination in the hiring and promotion of line
24truck drivers. The Court held that a large disparity between the per-
centage of blacks and Spanish-surnamed Americans employed as line
truck drivers and the percentage of these groups within the general
population of the area surrounding the defendant's truck terminals
was evidence of a pattern or practice of discrimination.Y This holding
implicitly suggests that the Court thought that any person in the sur-
rounding area was a qualified applicant for the job of a line truck
driver. The Court in Teamsters, however, did not specifically point to
any characteristics of the line truck driver job that made a labor mar-
ket comparison to the general population appropriate. Thus, Teamsters
provides district courts with no real guidance as to when the general
population should be considered the relevant qualified applicant pool.
The Court did attempt to define what it meant by qualified appli-
cant in Hazelwood School District v United States.' In Hazelwood, the
government claimed that a school district had engaged in a practice
and pattern of discrimination in the hiring of schoolteachers.' The dis-
fled applicant pool.
21 Id at 425. The Court, in Wards Cove Packing Co v Atonio, interpreted this burden on the
employer as a burden of production rather than as a burden of persuasion. 490 US 642, 659-60
(1989). The 1991 Civil Rights Act overturned that part of the Wards Cove decision and codified
the more natural reading of Albemarle. In particular, under the Act, if a plaintiff demonstrates
that an employment practice causes a disparate impact, the defendant, to avoid liability, must
demonstrate that the challenged practice is job related. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub L No 102-
166,105 Stat 1074, codified at 42 USC § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (1994).
22 Albemarle, 422 US at 425. Moreover, the 1991 Civil Rights Act has codified this holding.
42 USC § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(ii) (1994).
23 431 US 324 (1977).
24 Id at 329.
25 Id at 337.
26 433 US 299 (1977).
V7 Id at 301.
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trict court found that plaintiffs' evidence that the school district em-
ployed a relatively small number of black teachers lacked probative
value because the proportion of black students was also small.n The
Supreme Court, in rejecting this evaluation technique, concluded, "a
proper comparison was between the racial composition of Hazel-
wood's teaching staff and the racial composition of the qualified pub-
lic school teacher population in the relevant labor market."2'9 In a
footnote, the Court noted that "[w]hen special qualifications are re-
quired to fill particular jobs, comparisons to the general population
(rather than to the smaller group of individuals who possess the nec-
essary qualifications) may have little probative value.' '3 Although the
Court in Hazelwood pointed out some relevant factors in determining
the relevant labor market,3 ' it did not provide a legal standard for de-
ciding which labor market participants to properly include in the
qualified applicant pool.
28 Id at 304 (describing the district court holding that "statistics showing that relatively
small numbers of Negroes were employed as teachers" were not probative because "the per-
centage of Negro pupils in Hazelwood was similarly small").
29 Id at 308 (stating which statistical comparisons are proper in employment discrimination
cases). This Comment does not address the degree of statistical disparity between the minority
composition of the employer's workforce and the minority composition of the qualified appli-
cant pool necessary for a court to find discrimination. That particular issue is addressed by the
EEOC in the following way: If the selection rate for the protected group is less than four-fifths,
or 80 percent, of the selection rate for the most favored group, the requirement is presumed to
have a disparate impact. 29 CFR § 1607.4(D) (1999). This standard has been criticized by com-
mentators and rejected by courts. See, for example, Elaine W. Shoben, Comment, Differential
Pass-Fail Rates in Employment Testing: Statistical Proof Under Title VII, 91 Harv L Rev 793, 805-
11 (1978) (criticizing the four-fifths rule for not taking into account sample size differences and
comparing only ratios); Clady v County of Los Angeles, 770 F2d 1421, 1428 (9th Cir 1985) (re-
jecting the four-fifths test and noting that the EEOC guidelines do not have the force of law).
See also Joseph L. Gastwirth, Employment Discrimination: A Statistician's Look at Analysis of
Disparate Impact Claims, 11 L & Ineq J 151, 155 (1992) (suggesting a statistical test for deter-
mining whether a firm has engaged in discrimination).
30 Hazelwood, 433 US at 308 n 13 (noting that in different cases different comparisons will
be appropriate based on the job skills required for the employment in question).
31 The Court noted the following factors as possibly relevant to the determination of the
qualified applicant pool for teaching positions in the Hazelwood School District: "(i) whether
the racially based hiring policies of the St. Louis City School District [a neighboring city school
district which had a policy of trying to maintain a 50 percent black teaching staff] were in effect
as far back as 1970, the year in which the census figures were taken; (ii) to what extent those
policies have changed the racial composition of that district's teaching staff from what it would
otherwise have been; (ii) to what extent St. Louis' recruitment policies have diverted to the city,
teachers who might otherwise have applied to Hazelwood; (iv) to what extent Negro teachers
employed by the city would prefer employment in other districts such as Hazelwood; and (v)
what the experience in other school districts in St. Louis County indicates about the validity of
excluding the City School District from the relevant labor market." Id at 312.
32 In both Teamsters and Hazelwood, the government brought the suit based upon the the-
ory of a "pattern or practice" of discrimination. In "pattern or practice" cases, the employer's
discriminatory intent is relevant to establishing a violation of Title VII. Teamsters, 431 US at 336
(stating that in a pattern or practice case the plaintiff must establish that discrimination is the de-
fendant's "standard operating procedure"). In disparate impact cases, discriminatory intent is not
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After Teamsters and Hazelwood, there was a great deal of uncer-
tainty regarding how to determine the composition of the qualified
applicant pool. This uncertainty is exemplified by the Ninth Circuit's
ruling in Wards Cove Packing Co v Atonio;3 which the Supreme Court
subsequently overruled in its next attempt (and failure) to define the
scope and shape of the qualified applicant pool.
In Wards Cove, the plaintiffs claimed that an Alaskan cannery's
hiring practices had a disparate impact on non-white workers.3' As a
threshold matter, the plaintiff showed that there were a high percent-
age of non-white workers in lower paying cannery jobs and a low per-
centage of such workers in defendant's noncannery positions.6 The
Court rejected this statistical comparison as irrelevant, reiterating that
the "proper comparison [is] between the racial composition of [the at-
issue jobs] and the racial composition of the qualified ... population in
the relevant labor market."'7 Unfortunately, the Court in Wards Cove
did not define which labor market participants were part of the quali-
fied applicant pool for the noncannery positions.
In sum, despite a number of different rulings tangentially related
to the issue of qualified applicant pool determination, there is no
meaningful Supreme Court precedent on exactly how a district court
should decide the issue. This lack of precedent leaves a critical gap in
the law because the make-up of the qualified applicant pool is an es-
sential part of a plaintiff's prima facie disparate impact case.
relevant. However, in "pattern or practice" cases, "[w]here gross statistical disparities [between
the employer's workforce and the qualified applicant pool] can be shown, they alone may in a
proper case constitute prima facie proof of a pattern or practice of discrimination." Hazelwood,
433 US at 307-08 (citations omitted). A statistical disparity between the minority make-up of the
employer's workforce and the minority make-up of the qualified applicant pool may also be
relevant as proof of discriminatory intent in individual disparate treatment cases. See Furnco
Construction Corp v Waters, 438 US 567,580 (1978) (stating that the district court "was entitled
to consider the racial mix of the work force when trying to make the determination as to motiva-
tion"). Thus, the qualified applicant pool determination may be relevant in "pattern or practice"
and disparate treatment cases, as well as in disparate impact cases.
33 827 F2d 439,444 (9th Cir 1987), revd, 490 US 642 (1989).
34 Wards Cove Packing Co v Atonio, 490 US 642, 650 (1989) (referring to the Ninth Cir-
cuit's finding that statistics comparing the percentage of minority workers in low skill positions
with the percentage of minority workers in high skill positions were sufficient to support an in-
ference of discrimination). Obviously, such comparative statistics, as the Supreme Court recog-
nized, are inapplicable when defining the "qualified" applicant pool.
35 The alleged illegitimate hiring practices included nepotism, a rehire preference, a lack of
objective hiring criteria, separate hiring channels, and a practice of not hiring from within. Id at
650 (stating that the court of appeals had relied on plaintiff's "statistics showing a high percent-
age of nonwhite workers in the cannery jobs and a low percentage of such workers in the non-
cannery positions").
36 Id at 650.
37 Id, citing Hazelwood, 433 US at 308.
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B. Lower Courts' Methodology to Determine the Qualified
Applicant Pool
Because the Supreme Court has not laid out specific guidelines
for defining the scope of the qualified applicant pool, district courts
have developed various methods for making this determination. In
addition, because qualified applicant pool determinations are typically
considered findings of fact, a circuit court will usually defer to the
judgement of the district courts on this issue.3
This Part outlines the two principal methods district courts have
used to define the qualified applicant pool and then demonstrates
how, in practice, each of these methods inevitably leads to an ad hoc
determination of the qualified applicant pool.
1. The "applicant flow" method.
One method that courts use to determine the qualified applicant
pool is based on the idea of "applicant flow." The applicant flow
method considers only those labor market participants who actually
apply for the job at issue as the relevant qualified applicant pool
Using the facts of Wards Cove as an example, a court following the
applicant flow method would look only at those applicants who ap-
plied for noncannery positions as the qualified applicant pool.
The obvious flaw with the applicant flow method is that it ignores
the effect that a hiring requirement that is known to have a disparate
impact would have on a potentially qualified applicant's decision
whether or not to apply for the job in the first place. It is unlikely that
a potentially qualified applicant would take the time to apply for a job
if she knew that a particular hiring requirement would prevent her
from getting the job.4' In addition, the applicant flow method will in-
38 See De Medina v Reinhardt, 686 F2d 997,1004 (DC Cir 1982) (noting that the definition
of the relevant labor market is generally reviewed on appeal under the clearly erroneous stan-
dard as an essentially factual matter); Castaneda v Pickard, 648 F2d 989, 1003 (5th Cir 1981)
(stating that the determination of the relevant labor market "is an essentially factual matter
within the special competence of the district court").
39 See Hazelwood, 433 US at 308 n 13 (finding applicant flow statistics very relevant);
United States v County of Fairfax, 629 F2d 932,940 (4th Cir 1980) (suggesting that applicant flow
data is the most salient proof as to the proper labor market); Anderson v Douglas & Lomason
Co, 26 F3d 1277, 1286-87 (5th Cir 1994) (stating that "applicant flow figures are the preferred
method by which to measure an employer's hiring practices" by using "applications of those per-
sons who actually sought employment" with the defendant to determine the available labor
pool); Hester v Southern Railway Co, 497 F2d 1374,1379 (5th Cir 1974) (stating that "[t]he most
direct route to proof of racial discrimination in hiring is proof of disparity between the percent-
age of blacks among those applying for a particular position and the percentage of blacks among
those hired for the position").
40 It does not make a difference whether the applicant, who is otherwise qualified, does not
apply because she knows that she does not meet the hiring requirement, or she knows, in a prob-
abilistic sense, that she is unlikely to meet the requirement due to her protected class. In either
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sulate the most egregious discriminators from suit under a disparate
impact theory of discrimination because these discriminators, known
for their discriminatory practices, are the least likely to receive appli-
cations from minorities.
2. The proxy labor market approach.
The other method that district courts typically use to determine
the scope and shape of the qualified applicant pool is to look at the
minority composition of some proxy labor market.' The proxy labor
market is usually some composite of the current holders of the types
of jobs at issue. The court then assumes, by analogy, that the composi-
tion of this proxy labor market is also the composition of the qualified
applicant pool.
For example, in NAACP v Town of East Haven,42 the plaintiffs
claimed that the town's hiring practices had a discriminatory impact
on blacks. 3 The court used all the certified teachers within a particular
region as a proxy for the qualified applicant pool of teachers for East
Haven public schools." That is, the court assessed the racial composi-
tion of all the certified teachers in the surrounding region and then
proceeded in its disparate impact analysis assuming this composition
was the same as the composition of the qualified applicant pool.
The proxy labor market approach, while simple, is flawed for
three reasons. First, given the historical roots of discrimination, the la-
bor market proxies courts usually choose (for example, current job
holders in the types of jobs at issue) will underestimate the number of
minorities in the qualified applicant pool. In particular, by assessing
the minority composition of the qualified applicant pool by reference
to the current holders of the jobs at issue when those current job
holders received their employment in an era of systematic discrimina-
case, the applicant flow method will construct a distorted qualified applicant pool. See Barbara
Lindemann and Paul Grossman, 2 Employment Discrimination Law 1707 (ABA 3d ed 1996)
(stating that sometimes applicant flow data are distorted "when a defendant's reputation for dis-
crimination, recruiting criteria, or recruiting practices produce disproportionately few minority
applicants").
41 See NAACP v Town of East Haven, 998 F Supp 176, 186 (D Conn 1998) (holding that
the plaintiffs established a prima facie disparate impact case because, "[i]n an area with a size-
able black population, the [town's] failure to hire a black employee cannot be explained as a
normal variance"); Kilgo v Bowman Transportation, Inc, 570 F Supp 1509, 1514-15 (N D Ga
1983) (using national labor pool statistics to assess case of regional and local hiring practices for
truck drivers).
42 998 F Supp 176 (D Conn 1998).
43 Id at 183.
44 Id at 178. Note that this case involved a claim against the city for discrimination in all
public sectors of employment; however, this Comment focuses on how the court constructed the
qualified applicant pool for the claim of discrimination in the hiring of teachers for the public
schools.
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tion, the court will end up with a proxy labor market which is itself a
product of discrimination. Such a proxy labor market approach will, in
effect, lock-in and legitimize the current minority composition' in the
jobs at issue.
Second, the proxy labor market approach does not take into ac-
count changing labor market opportunities. The current minority
composition in the job at issue only reflects the qualified applicant
pool if the current job holders. and current qualified job applicants
faced the same labor market opportunity at the time they chose to
apply for a job or engage in job training. This is unlikely to be the case
due to the advent of stricter enforcement of discrimination laws.4'
Third, the labor market proxy approach ignores any potential la-
bor supply substitution effects. In particular, by focusing on current
job holders, the labor market proxy method does not account for
those labor market participants who could easily switch into the job at
issue. In the schoolteacher labor market for example, the participants
not accounted for could include recently retired teachers, teachers at
private schools, and recent liberal arts graduates (who could quickly
get certified). By ignoring this potentially strong labor supply substitu-
tion effect, the proxy approach could underestimate (or overestimate)
the minority composition of the qualified applicant pool. Whether the
labor proxy approach overestimates or underestimates the minority
composition of the qualified applicant pool depends on the minority
make-up of the possible substitute labor market participants.
In conclusion, both the applicant flow method and the labor mar-
ket proxy method of determining the relevant qualified applicant pool
are potentially flawed from an economic standpoint. Courts need an
alternative legal test to determine the scope and shape of the qualified
applicant pool. The antitrust principles outlined in Part III of this
Comment provide the substantive basis for such an alternative legal
test. Before turning to these principles to define the scope and the
shape of the qualified applicant pool, however, it is first necessary to
show that labor markets are, from an economic theory standpoint, the
same as commodity markets.
ii. THE ECONOMIC EQUIVALENCE OF LABOR MARKETS AND
COMMODITY MARKETS
The standard neoclassical economic model assumes that firms
seek to maximize profits and consumers seek to maximize their utility
45 This point, of course, assumes that stricter enforcement of discrimination laws has had
an impact on the marketplace. That is, without this enforcement there would be the same amount
of discrimination against qualified minority candidates today as was historically the case.
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subject to budget constraints.4 From these standard assumptions, de-
mand and supply functions are easily derived. 7 A supply function
shows how a firm's production decision (how much of a product to
produce) changes when the price of a product changes.48 A demand
function shows how a consumer's purchasing decisions change when
the price of the product changes.49 Firms are not only suppliers of
products, but also are consumers of labor. Similarly, consumers are not
only purchasers of products, but also are suppliers of labor. In a labor
market the price at which the consumers sell their labor is the wage
and the quantity of the good produced is the hours of work.
In a commodity market, the equilibrium price is determined by
the intersection of the supply and demand functions for that particular
product (at a price where the quantity supplied of the product equals
the quantity demanded by the consumer).'o Analogously, in the labor
market, the equilibrium wage is determined by the intersection of the
supply and demand functions for labor. There is nothing in the stan-
dard economic model that makes commodity markets any different
than labor markets-that is, the same rational, utility maximizing as-
sumptions underlie the derivation of supply and demand functions in
both types of markets.
Moreover, one would expect similar comparative static results in
both commodity markets and labor markets.51 In a commodity market,
as the price of a particular product rises the quantity supplied of that
product normally increases (as producers increase production to take
advantage of higher prices),' and the quantity demanded of that
product normally decreases (as consumers substitute to alternative
products).53 In a labor market, as the wage increases, the quantity of
labor supplied normally increases (as working more hours becomes
more attractive when wages rise),n and the quantity of labor de-
46 See Hal R. Varian, Microeconomic Analysis 23,94 (W.W. Norton 3d ed 1992) (discussing
basic economic assumptions underlying firm and consumer behavior).
47 Id at 40-48,94-110.
48 ' Id at 216.
49 Id at 99.
50 Id at 219 (stating that "[ain equilibrium price is a price where the amount demanded
equals the amount supplied").
51 Comparative static results indicate how a consumer's or a producer's choice changes
when an exogenous variable changes (for example, how a consumer's demand for a product
changes when the price of that product changes). See Hal R. Varian, Intermediate Microeconom-
ics 9 (W.W. Norton 2d ed 1990) (defining comparative statics and providing an example).
52 Varian, Microeconomic Analysis at 215-17 (cited in note 46).
53 George J. Borjas, Labor Economics 43-46,101-51 (McGraw-Hill 1996); Varian, Micro-
economic Analysis at 46,116-24 (cited in note 46).
54 Of course, this ignores the backward-bending part of the labor supply curve. In the
backward-bending part of the curve a rise in the wage actually reduces the amount of labor sup-
plied because labor market participants switch out of work into leisure. See Borjas, Labor Eco-
nomics at 43 (cited in note 53).
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manded normally decreases (as producers use capital, which is now
relatively less expensive, instead of labor).-5
Because the same economic theory of behavior underlies supply
and demand activities in both commodity markets and labor markets,
analogous legal principles should be used when defining the scope and
shape of either market.
III. ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES IN THE LABOR MARKET CONTEXT
A. Antitrust Relevant-Market Principles
To establish a monopolization claim under Section 2 of the
Sherman Act, a plaintiff must show "(1) the possession of monopoly
power in the relevant market and (2) the willful acquisition or main-
tenance of that power."5 Under step one of the monopolization stan-
dard, the determination of the relevant commodity market is crucial.
Typically, plaintiffs in Section 2 cases seek to limit the relevant
market to as few producers as possible. This will often lead to a find-
ing that the defendant has a high market share because the defen-
dant's sales in the market will be compared to fewer other firms'
sales. Such a finding is valuable to the plaintiff because courts often
infer that a large market share coincides with monopoly power.'
In contrast, defendants in Section 2 cases seek to include as many
different producers as possible in the relevant market because this will
often lead to a finding of a small market share. Because a high degree
of market power (i.e., monopoly power) is the gravamen of a Section 2
claim,59 a defendant that can prove it has a small market share will
typically prevail.' o Therefore, in monopolization cases, like disparate
impact cases, the determination of the relevant market (i.e., either the
commodity market or the labor market, depending on the type of
case) is a critical element of the cause of action.
The Supreme Court has defined the relevant commodity market
for Section 2 cases as the intersection of the relevant product market
and the relevant geographic market.6'
55 Varian, Microeconomic Analysis at 70-74 (cited in note 46).
56 United States v Grinnell, 384 US 563,570-71 (1966).
57 See Phillip E. Areeda, John L. Solow, and Herbert Hovenkamp, 2A Antitrust Law 532
at 163 (Little, Brown 1995) (stating that market share is the defendant's share of total sales in a
"defined relevant market").
58 See United States v Aluminum Co of America, 148 F2d 416,424 (2d Cir 1945) ("Alcoa")
(finding that 90 percent market share constituted monopoly power, but that it was doubtful if 60
percent would be enough and "certainly" 33 percent would not be enough).
59 Grinnell, 384 US at 570-71.
60 Alcoa, 148 F2d at 424.
61 Grinnell, 384 US at 571-76 (defining relevant product and relevant geographic markets
to make finding of monopoly power under Sherman Act Section 2). See also Smith v Northern
Michigan Hospitals, 703 F2d 942,954 (6th Cir 1983) (stating that in order to succeed on a mo-
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1. The relevant product market.
The relevant product market contains those "products that have
reasonable interchangeability for the purposes for which they are
produced-price, use and qualities considered."' In order to deter-
mine whether products are reasonably interchangeable, district courts
typically look at the ease of substitution from both the demand and
the supply sides of the market.6'
a) Demand-side elasticity. From the demand side, if a price in-
crease for product A induces most buyers to switch to product B, then
A and B are said to be in the same relevant market.A This is equiva-
lent to saying that there is a high cross-price elasticity of demand be-
tween the products."
In its 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines,6 the Justice Depart-
ment quantified a demand-side elasticity test in the following fashion:
If the producer of product A and the producer of product B were to
act together as a hypothetical monopolist, could they impose a "small
but significant and nontransitory" price increase? If so, then products
A and B are considered to be in the same relevant market.6
b) Supply-side elasticity.From the supply side of the market, the
elasticity test hinges on the ability of producers to alter their produc-
tion technology to produce a different product."8 For example, if pro-
ducer A can easily switch its production technology to produce prod-
uct B, then producer B would be constrained in its ability to raise the
nopolization claim plaintiffs must establish the relevant product and geographic markets).
62 United States v E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co, 351 US 377,404 (1956).
63 Areeda, Solow, and Hovenkamp,2A Antitrust Law 561 at 252 (cited in note 57) (stat-
ing that two products are in the same relevant market if substitutability is very high from either
the demand side or the supply side).
64 Of course, to avoid engaging in the so-called "cellophane fal.lacy," the relevant price
from which to evaluate the hypothetical price increase should be the competitive market price,
not the monopoly price. See Richard A. Posner, Antitrust Law: An Economic Perspective 128
(Chicago 1976) (discussing the appropriate price level from which to evaluate effects of price in-
creases to determine if products are reasonably interchangeable and in the same relevant mar-
ket).
65 The Supreme Court recognized this cross-price elasticity of demand principle as relevant
to product market determinations in E.I. du Pont de Nemours, 351 US at 394. See also Tunis Bros
Co v Ford Motor Co, 952 F2d 715,725-26 (3d Cir 1991) (finding Ford and comparable tractors in
same relevant market due to cross-price elasticity of demand); Syufy Enterprises v American
Multicinema, Inc, 793 F2d 990, 994 (9th Cir 1986) (stating that the cross-elasticity of demand
must be considered in defining the relevant market); Hayden Publishing Co v Cox Broadcasting
Corp, 730 F2d 64,71 (2d Cir 1984) (stating that when defining the product market, one must con-
sider cross-price elasticity of demand). In short, the relevance of the cross-price elasticity of de-
mand to defining the relevant product market is not simply economic theory, but also part of the
legal standard adopted by the courts.
66 ABA Antitrust Section, The 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines: Commentary and Text
(ABA 1992).
67 Id § 1.11 at 28.
68 Areeda, Solow, and Hovenkamp, 2A Antitrust Law 561 at 253 (cited in note 57).
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price of product B. Thus, producer A and producer B should be in-
cluded in the same relevant market. 9
The Justice Department in its 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines
recognized this supply-side elasticity principle as critical to relevant
commodity market determinations. In particular, the Justice Depart-
ment stated that, in assessing the relevant commodity market for
merger evaluation purposes, it "will identify other firms not currently
producing or selling the relevant product in the relevant area as par-
ticipating in the relevant market if their inclusion would more accu-
rately reflect probable supply responses.'70
2. The relevant geographic market.
The Supreme Court has defined the relevant geographic market
for Section 2 purposes as "the area of effective competition ... in
which the seller operates, and to which the purchaser can practicably
turn for supplies. 71 The ability of a firm to sell its products beyond its
immediate location determines the geographic scope of the relevant
market.? The Supreme Court has stated that the geographic market
must be one that both corresponds to the commercial realities of the
industry and represents an economically significant trade area.73
Courts have looked at a number of factors in order to, define the scope
of the relevant geographic market. These factors include, but are not
limited to, transportation costs, actual sales, and regional price rela-
tionships.74
69 The Supreme Court recognized this supplier substitution principle as part of the legal
standard for defining the relevant product market in United States v Columbia Steel Co, 334 US
495,510-11 (1948). See also Brown Shoe Co v United States, 370 US 294,325 n 42 (1962) (stating
that "cross-elasticity of production facilities may [] be an important factor in defining the prod-
uct market").
70 Guidelines § 1.32 at 33 (cited in note 66) (discussing how to include firms in the relevant
product market by evaluating supply responses to a potential price increase in the product of the
merging companies).
71 Tampa Electric Co v Nashville Coal Co, 365 US 320,327 (1961).
72 Areeda, Solow, and Hovenkamp, 2A Antitrust Law 550 at 213 (cited in note 57).
73 See United States v Phillipsburg National Bank & Trust Co, 399 US 350,359-62 (1970)
(taking into account the commercial realities in the banking industry when determining the rele-
vant geographic market); Brown Shoe Co v United States, 370 US 294,336-37 (1962) (stating that
the relevant geographic market must "both correspond to the commercial realities of the indus-
try and be economically significant") (citations omitted).
. 74 In United States v General Dynamics Corp, the Supreme Court recognized the legal sig-
nificance of transportation costs for the geographic market determination, stating that "a realis-
tic geographic market should be defined in terms of transportation arteries and freight charges
that determine the cost of [delivery]." 415 US 486, 491, 510-11 (1974). See also Erie Sand and
Gravel Co v FTC, 291 F2d 279, 282 (3d Cir 1961) (finding that high transportation costs effec-
tively limited the area to which a seller making sand for concrete could conceivably sell); Ameri-
can Crystal Sugar Co v Cuban-American Sugar Co, 259 F2d 524,528-29 (2d Cir 1958) (finding
that high transportation costs limited the area in which sugar refineries could sell).
. The Supreme Court and a number of lower courts have looked at actual sales patterns to de-
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The Justice Department's approach to defining the relevant geo-
graphic market mirrors its approach to defining the relevant product
market. The 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines define the relevant
geographic market as "a region such that a hypothetical monopolist
that was the only present or future producer of the relevant product at
locations in that region would profitably impose at least a 'small but
significant and nontransitory' increase in price.' '7' Simply put, the rele-
vant geographic market under the Justice Department's standard is
the region encompassing the smallest subset of producers of a product
who, acting collectively, could implement a price increase.
In sum, a court's determination of the relevant commodity mar-
ket for monopolization purposes consists of two parts: (1) the relevant
product market and (2) the relevant geographic market. Moreover,
there is Supreme Court precedent setting forth legal tests for defining
these two markets (for example, the "reasonable interchangeability"
test for product market analysis,76 and the "suppliers to whom buyers
could practicably turn" test for geographic market analysis'). Thus, in
theory, district courts in monopolization cases can, by using these sim-
ple legal tests, resolve in a systematic way the issue of which producers
are and which producers are not part of the relevant commodity mar-
ket.
Furthermore, these tests, while not always leading to a perfect
delineation of the relevant commodity market, seem to work in most
cases.'7 In addition, by focusing on both demand and supply side con-
termine the scope of the geographic market. See United States v Marine Bancorporation, 418 US
602, 619 (1974) (affirming district court determination that relevant geographic market for bank
merger was metropolitan area in which all of target's bank offices operated); United States v
Pabst Brewing Co, 384 US 546,550-52 (1966) (examining sales throughout the United States, in a
three state area, and in the state of Wisconsin to determine the legality of a merger); Houser v
Fox Theatres Management Co, 845 F2d 1225,1230 n 10 (3d Cir 1988) (affirming the district court
definition of a local geographic market because patrons of first-run films primarily attended lo-
cal theatres).
Courts have also looked at regional price relationship to see if two products are in the same
geographic market. That is, the court looks to see if the prices of two products in two different
regions move together over time; if so, they are arguably within the same geographic market. See
Rothery Storage & Van Co v Atlas Van Lines, 792 F2d 210,219 (DC Cir 1986) (suggesting that
absence of evidence that prices moved independently undercuts allegations that the two areas
were actually two separate markets).
75 Guidelines § 1.21 (cited in note 66) (describing general standard to delineate the rele-
vant geographic market).
76 United States v E.L du Pont de Nemours & Co, 351 US 377,404 (1956) (describing "rea-
sonable interchangeability" test for product market analysis).
77 Tampa Electric Co, 365 US at 327 (describing general test to be used when defining the
relevant geographic market).
78 See RelMax International Inc v Realty One Inc, 173 F3d 995, 1017-18 (6th Cir 1999)
(finding that the relevant geographic market for real estate agents in northeast Ohio consisted of
more than one political subdivision); Queen City Pizza, Inc v Domino's Pizza, Inc, 124 F3d 430,
436-39 (3d Cir 1997) (discussing and applying the relevant product market standard to pizza in-
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siderations, the courts have been able to mold the definition of the
relevant commodity market in monopolization cases to reflect the un-
derlying economic theory of firm and consumer behavior. Thus, in the
antitrust arena, the legal doctrine is supported by economic theory. As
noted earlier, the same cannot be said for the current way courts de-
fine the relevant qualified applicant pool in disparate impact cases.
B. Application of Antitrust Relevant-Market Principles to Disparate
Impact Cases
To apply relevant-market principles from antitrust law in the la-
bor market context, one must first define the relevant product market
for labor (by reference to the cross-price elasticity of the demand for
labor and the elasticity of the supply of labor). Then one must go a
step further and define the relevant geographic market for labor.
1. Cross-elasticity of demand in the labor market context.
In a commodity market, cross-price elasticity of demand reflects
the degree to which consumers shift from product A to product B
when the price of product A rises. If the typical consumer is apt to
switch from A to B, then A and B are considered part of the same
relevant product market.79 In the labor market context, this same legal
test can be applied as follows: Suppose there are two workers, A and
B. If, when worker A raises her wage (i.e., demands a higher starting
salary), the typical employer is apt to switch and hire worker B, then
worker A and worker B should be included in the same qualified ap-
plicant pool. The typical employer is apt to switch to worker B be-
cause workers A and B have similar skills and worker A demanded a
higher wage. In a very real sense the employer considers workers A
and B "interchangeable"; thus they should be included in the same
relevant labor market.
2. Supply elasticity in the labor market context.
In the commodity market, supply elasticity reflects the degree to
which other producers can enter a particular market if a producer in
that market were to raise its price (i.e., the scope of potential en-
trantss). For example, suppose producer A makes steel rods and pro-
ducer B makes steel beams. Also, suppose the production technology
is such that a producer can easily switch from making rods to making
gredients); United States v Waste Management, Inc, 743 F2d 976, 979-80 (2d Cir 1984) (addressing
the proper commodity market definition for waste disposal services in Texas).
79 See text accompanying notes 64-65.
80 See text accompanying notes 68-69.
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beams. In this case, producer A and producer B would have a high
elasticity of supply (due to the ability of A to switch production and
produce steel beams if B tried to raise the price of beams), and would
therefore be considered in the same relevant commodity market.
In the labor market context, the idea of supply elasticity hinges
on the cost of switching jobs. Take again workers A and B. Suppose A
is a teacher in a private school and B teaches in a public school. If,
when the public school raises the wage for worker B, worker A is apt
to switch jobs (akin to changing his production technology from
beams to rods) and also is apt to be hired by the public school (akin to
being able to produce the same type of steel beams as worker B),
worker A and worker B have a high elasticity of supply. Hence,
worker A and worker B should be considered in the same qualified
applicant pool.
3. The relevant geographic market in the labor market context.
In the commodity market context, the relevant geographic mar-
ket consists of the region to which a buyer could reasonably turn for
suppliers.8' This Comment has previously noted that courts have used
transportation costs, actual sales, and regional price relationships to
determine the scope of the relevant geographic market in monopoli-
zation cases.8 Each of these factors has an analog in the labor market
context.
A court looking at transportation costs in the labor market con-
text would simply look to the cost of relocating to a particular com-
munity for a job, or, alternatively, the costs of commuting to work. A
court could use the relationship between these costs and the wages
paid in the job at issue as one way to determine the area of the rele-
vant geographic market.' For example, in the law firm first-year asso-
ciate market the wage paid is substantially more than the relocation
costs for a law student located anywhere in the United States. Thus,
the relevant geographic market for law firm associates would, most
likely, be the entire nation. In contrast, in the fast food worker market,
the wage paid is small relative to the transportation costs for a labor
market participant living outside of the surrounding neighborhood.
Thus, in the fast food labor market, the relevant geographic market
would, most likely, be the surrounding neighborhood.
81 Tampa Electric Co v Nashville Coal Co,365 US 320,327 (1961).
82 See text accompanying notes 71-74.
83 See Herbert Hovenkamp, Federal Antitrust Policy: The Law of Competition and its Prac-
tice 113-14 (West 2d ed 1999) (defining the minimum geographic market for antitrust purposes
in terms of a ratio similar to the one advocated here).
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A court looking at actual sales in the labor market context
would look at where the current holders of the jobs at issue were re-
cruited. If the firm had previously hired or recruited workers from the
entire nation, under an actual sales approach to defining the relevant
geographic labor market, the entire nation should be considered the
relevant geographic labor market.8
A court using regional price relationships to determine the rele-
vant geographic labor market would look at the correlation between
the wages paid in two different locations for the same job. If these
wages moved together over time, this would provide evidence that the
two locations should be included in the same geographic labor mar-
ket.n
4. The Merger Guidelines relevant-market approach in the labor
market context.
The Merger Guidelines provide another way to define the rele-
vant commodity market. Moreover, as previously indicated, the
Guidelines' approach is based upon the same economic principles as
the approach developed by the case law. Thus, a court could define the
qualified applicant pool by using the Guidelines' approach. This is
simply an alternative way to think about applying antitrust principles
to define the qualified applicant pool. The 1992 Merger Guidelines de-
fine the relevant product market as the smallest subset of products for
which, if produced by a single firm, that firm could implement a small
but significant price increase.u In the labor market context, this ap-
proach would define as the qualified applicant pool the smallest sub-
set of workers who, acting collectively, could implement a small but
significant wage increase.
Similarly, the 1992 Merger Guidelines define the relevant geo-
graphic market as the region encompassing the smallest subset of
producers of a product who, if they acted collectively, could implement
a small but significant price increases In the labor market context, this
approach would define the relevant geographic market as the region
encompassing the smallest subset of qualified workers (as defined by
the product market test above) who, acting collectively, could imple-
ment a small but significant wage increase.
84 Note how in the fast food labor market and the first-year associate labor market a court
using the actual sales approach to determining the relevant labor market would come out with
the same result as a court using the transportation costs approach. "
85 Of course, when doing this a court would have to account for general labor market
trends. This could easily be done using a simple regression analysis.
86 See text accompanying note 67.
87 See text accompanying note 75.
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5. Potential problems with applying antitrust principles in the
labor market context.
There are several potential problems with applying relevant-
market principles from antitrust law to define the scope and shape of
the qualified applicant pool in Title VII cases.
First, the proper delineation of the qualified applicant pool using
antitrust relevant-market principles is a tricky and probably expensive
process!' Moreover, determining the qualified applicant pool is only
necessary insofar as it allows the plaintiff to establish her prima facie
disparate impact case. Thus, the argument would go: forcing plaintiffs
to bear this cost simply to establish their prima facie case is unfair.
This argument ignores the basic theory that underlies the Griggs
disparate impact theory of discrimination. That is, a facially neutral
hiring practice can violate Title VII even if there is no evidence of dis-
criminatory intent on the part of the employer? An argument can be
made that before an inference of discrimination is made in the ab-
sence of intent, that inference must be supported by evidence of a dis-
parate impact.
In Griggs, what the Court was most concerned about were prac-
tices that were "fair in form, but discriminatory in operation. '
Whether the hiring practice is "discriminatory in operation" depends
on whether the hiring practice has a disparate impact on "qualified
applicants." The only way to determine this is to accurately construct
the qualified applicant pool. If the qualified applicant pool determina-
tion is inaccurate, it is possible that a court could find an employer li-
able for discrimination where there was no evidence of discriminatory
intent and no evidence of discriminatory impact generated by a fa-
cially neutral hiring requirement. Such a finding of liability extends Ti-
tle VII too far and seems unjust. Moreover, a persuasive argument
could be made that the plaintiff should bear the cost of accurately
constructing the qualified applicant pool, since by making a disparate
impact claim the plaintiff basically admits she cannot prove discrimi-
natory intent.
The second potential problem with delineating the qualified ap-
plicant pool through antitrust relevant-market principles concerns the
availability of data. In order to use the method advocated in this
Comment, a court needs extensive data on wages and job mobility.
Fortunately, there are a number of sources of data on wages and gen-
88 The fact that litigants in antitrust cases often spend a significant amount of resources
trying to define the relevant commodity market is evidence of just how tricky and expensive de-
lineating a market can be.
89 See text accompanying notes 14-17.
90 Griggs, 401 US at 431.
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eral market behavior that are readily available.91 Thus, there is no rea-
son to think an economist testifying in a disparate impact case would
face any greater data difficulties than an economist testifying in a mo-
nopolization case would.9
IV. A GUIDE TO APPLYING ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES IN
DISPARATE IMPACT CASES
A. The General Model
When determining the shape and scope of the qualified applicant
pool, a court should make three distinct findings of fact-presumably
through expert economist testimony-regarding labor market partici-
pant behavior. The first two questions go to defining the relevant
product market and the third set of questions goes to defining the
relevant geographic market. Courts should ask: (1) Is the labor market
participant considered by the typical employer interchangeable with
the current job holder? (the cross-price elasticity of demand ques-
tion); (2) Will a small but substantial increase in the wages paid for the
job at issue induce other labor market participants to apply for that
job? (the supply elasticity question); and (3) What are the relocation
costs in relation to the wages paid?n (the relevant geographic market
question). Based on the facts garnered from these three questions, a
district court could correctly decide the scope and shape of the quali-
fied applicant pool.
B. Application of the General Model: McClain v Lufkin Industries
In McClain v Lufkin Industries, Inc, the plaintiffs filed a class ac-
tion lawsuit alleging that Lufkin Industries' subjective hiring require-
ments, though neutral on their face, had a disparate impact on blacks
applying for entry level positions.95 The court principally relied on sta-
91 See, for example, The Bureau of Labor Statistics website at <http://stats.bls.gov/> (visited
Apr 29,2000) (providing occupational employment statistics including wage estimates by indus-
try); Sandra L. Hofferth, Wei-Jun J. Yeung, and Frank P. Stafford, Panel Study of Income Dynam-
ics, available online at <http://www.isr.umich.edulsrc/psidlindex.html> (visited Apr 29, 2000)
(providing information on over 50,000 individuals emphasizing the dynamic aspects of economic
and demographic behavior).
92 This is not to say that economists always have good data in antitrust cases or that courts
always make the correct inferences from the data presented in antitrust cases. All that this
Comment is claiming is that there is no reason to think economists and courts would be worse at
delineating the bounds of a labor market (i.e., the qualified applicant pool) than they are at de-
lineating the bounds of a commodity market. See text accompanying notes 83-85.
93 Alternatively, the court could focus on the correlation of wages among regions or the
area from which the employer generally recruits its applicants to determine the area of the geo-
graphic labor market.
94 187 FRD 267 (E D Tex 1999).
95 Id at 273. The plaintiffs in this case also alleged a disparate impact claim in promotion
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tistical evidence to find that the plaintiffs had satisfied their prima fa-
cie case of discrimination." This statistical evidence showed that the
ratio of blacks to whites in the pool of actual applicants was different
from the ratio of blacks to whites in the group offered employment.9"
The court concluded that because most applicants were referred to
Lufkin via the Texas Workforce Commission, which screened appli-
cants for certain minimum qualifications, a statistical comparison of
applicants to the group offered employment was accurate." This is
simply the "applicant flow" method of determining the relevant quali-
fied applicant pool (i.e., persons referred by the Commission to the
defendant-and only those persons-who then applied for an entry
level position at Lufkin were in the qualified applicant pool). If, in-
stead of using this "applicant flow" method for determining the quali-
fied applicant pool, the district court had applied antitrust principles,
the court could have developed a more accurate picture of the quali-
fied applicant pool. In particular, it could have determined the rele-
vant geographic and product markets for qualified applicants.
In determining the relevant product market, the district court
could have received evidence from an expert economist regarding
supply and demand elasticity. For demand elasticity the court should
have asked:
1) Would the typical employer view all labor market participants
referred by the Texas Workforce Commission as interchangeable
for entry-level jobs?
If the answer to question (1) was yes, then all labor market partici-
pants referred to Lufkin by the Texas Workforce Commission should
have been included in the qualified applicant pool." The court should
have then asked:
2) Would the typical employer view as interchangeable those la-
bor market participants who are referred by the Commission and
decisions. Id. For discussion purposes, however, this Comment focuses solely on the disparate
impact claim involving entry level employees.
96 Id at 275-77.
97 Id.
98 Id.
99 In order to get evidence on whether all labor market participants referred to Lufkin by
the Commission were "interchangeable," the court could take testimony from other employers
of entry level employees in the area surrounding Lufkin. In this way, the court could make a de-
termination as to whether all labor market participants referred by the Commission were indeed
"interchangeable" for entry level positions or, alternatively, only a smaller subset of those par-
ticipants (i.e., perhaps only those participants without a criminal record). If the answer to the in-
terchangeability question is no (not all referred labor market participants are "interchange-
able"), the court should look at a smaller subset of those participants to determine the qualified
applicant pool.
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those labor market participants who are not referred by the
Commission?
If the answer to question (2) was yes, then all labor market partici-
pants not referred to Lufkin by the Commission, yet still viewed as in-
terchangeable by the typical employer, should have been included in
the qualified applicant pool.
Of course, a court should not stop defining the qualified applicant
pool after asking the demand elasticity questions. It should also con-
sider supply elasticity. For example, in Lufkin, the court should have
asked:
3) If Lufkin were to raise its wage by a small but significant
amount, would other labor market participants not included in
the answers to questions (1) and (2) apply for a job at Lufkin?
If the answer to (3) was yes, then all of the labor market participants
induced into applying should have been included in the qualified ap-
plicant pool.
To define the relevant geographic market, the court could look at
any of three different factors: (1) the region from which Lufkin re-
cruits; (2) the correlation between the entry level wages paid by
Lufkin and the entry level wages paid in the surrounding area;n or (3)
the cost of relocation or commuting. If the court decided to define the
geographic market using the cost of commuting or relocating, it could
have asked the following series of questions:
(4) For a labor market participant from the region surrounding
the plant, what is the ratio of the participant's relocation costs
(i.e., the costs of commuting to work) to the wages paid by
Lufkin?
If this ratio was reasonably small, then all labor market participants
satisfying the product market test that also live in the surrounding
area should have been included in the relevant geographic market.
(5) For a labor market participant from anywhere in the state of
Texas, what is the ratio of the participant's relocation costs (i.e.,
the costs of moving near Lufkin's plant or the cost of commut-
ing) to the wages paid by Lufkin?
If this ratio was small, then all of the labor market participants living
in Texas who satisfy the relevant product market test should have
been included in the qualified applicant pool. The court should have
continued this line of questioning until it delineated the boundaries of
100 Note that if these two sets of wages are highly correlated, then presumably the sur-
rounding local areas should be included in the relevant geographic market.
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the relevant geographic market. Having received evidence on the
relevant product and geographic markets, the court in Lufkin could
have then accurately defined the qualified applicant pool.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme.Court has not provided lower courts with sufficient
practical guidance on how to define who is and who is not a qualified
applicant in Title VII disparate impact cases. This Comment provides
a framework for defining the qualified applicant pool that is grounded
in antitrust doctrine and economic theory. It requires district courts to
make three labor market determinations: (1) Which labor market par-
ticipants does the typical employer view as interchangeable? (2)
Which labor market participants are likely to switch jobs given an in-
crease in the wage of the job at issue? And, (3) What is the ratio of the
relocation costs for a labor market participant to the wages paid? Al-
though these findings may not always be easy to make, district courts
have managed to answer the same questions when determining the
extent of the relevant commodity market in Section 2 Sherman Act
cases.
Because labor markets and commodity markets are the same
from an economic theory standpoint, they should be treated the same
from a legal standpoint. Moreover, because antitrust relevant-market
principles force litigants to couch their arguments in terms of the un-
derlying economic structure of the market, applying these same prin-
ciples in Title VII disparate impact cases should force, by analogy, liti-
gants in those cases to couch arguments with an eye toward the un-
derlying structure of the relevant labor market. Finally, a district court,
using relevant market principles from antitrust jurisprudence, can cor-
rectly and, to some extent, predictably determine the scope and shape
of the qualified applicant pool.
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